A Breakdown of the Leandro Case

Yesterday’s decision from the North Carolina Supreme Court brings the Leandro case, a public school funding battle that has lasted more than three decades, to a close.  The case began in the 1990s, when several school districts argued that the state was failing to provide the “sound basic education” guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution.  Over the years, the courts agreed that children do have that right and that the state bears responsibility for ensuring access to it, regardless of where a child lives.  Litigation evolved into a long effort to determine whether the state was actually meeting that obligation and, if not, what could be done about it. 

Yesterday’s ruling marks a sharp turning point in that history.  The court rejected the judicial remedies that had been developed in recent years, declared the 2022 Leandro IV ruling void, and dismissed the case with prejudice.  The majority’s reasoning was grounded in limits on judicial power.  It acknowledged that while children do have a right to a basic education, the court cannot enforce that right through funding orders.  In practical terms, the decision shifts Leandro away from a court-driven effort to compel systemic change and leaves the realization of the constitutional right to a sound basic education largely in the hands of the legislature.

Everyone agrees, at least in theory, that children are supposed to receive a basic education. The real fight in Leandro has been over a harder question:  if the government fails to provide that education, can a court force the government to do what is necessary to fix the violation, even when doing so has financial consequences?  The majority’s answer was essentially no.  In its view, appropriations belong to the legislature, and the judiciary cannot cross that line without violating the separation of powers. That is why the case is often described as a separation-of-powers dispute.  The legislature controls public spending, and the courts interpret the Constitution.  The majority’s position is that the judiciary cannot preserve constitutional boundaries by stepping into the legislature’s lane. However, I will argue that this is not really about separation of powers, although it certainly looks that way on the surface.  

Here is what I mean:  

Imagine you have a contract with a company to repave your driveway for $10,000.  You pay half up front.  The company never shows.  You sue, and the judge agrees that the company breached the contract and that you are entitled to relief.  But then the judge says:  “I cannot order the company to spend money to make this right.  I can only recognize that you were wronged.”  At that point, your right has been acknowledged, but it has not really been secured.

That is the deeper problem Leandro exposes.  At its core, the case is about whether a right is truly meaningful if no institution can force the government to honor it.  I would argue that it is not.  A right becomes real, in any serious sense, only when the person who holds it can obtain a remedy when it is violated.  Without that, a “right,” is more like a wish that the government can choose to grant…or not.  A right is supposed to change what others are permitted to do.  If you have a right to compensation, that is not merely a nice statement about what would be fair.  It means someone owes you compensation.  They have a duty to you.  So, if children really do have a constitutional right to a sound basic education, then the state is not merely encouraged to provide one—it is obligated to.

Rights matter most when the person holding the right is powerless and the violator is powerful.  That is the whole point of constitutional rights:  they are supposed to protect individuals from being at the mercy of government discretion.  But it the government itself decides whether to honor the right, and no outside institution can compel compliance, then the right depends entirely on the goodwill of the very actor it is supposed to constrain.  

Courts are not supposed to govern.  But they are supposed to serve as a check when another branch violates constitutional limits.  If the legislature can define the scope of its own duty, violate that duty, and then avoid any effective judicial remedy by invoking separation of powers, then the separation of powers is no longer functioning as a safeguard.  

So, that is the question Leandro leaves behind:  do children in North Carolina have a constitutional right to a sound basic education, or do they merely have permission to hope for one?  Because if the state can violate that right and no institution can force a remedy, then the right is not sovereign over power; power is sovereign over the right.  And once that becomes true, what has been lost is not only this case, but the very idea that constitutional rights are meant to protect the powerless from the powerful.